Related Papers
Diplomatic History
Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes's Wartime Diplomacy: Making Spain a Haven from Hitler*
2012 •
Emmet Kennedy
Mediterranean-First? La pianificazione strategica anglo-americana e le origini dell'occupazione alleata in Italia (1939-1943), Napoli, FedOA Press, 2017, 285 pp.
2017 •
Marco Maria Aterrano
The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated. This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design.
At Odds with Itself: British Policy towards 'France' 1941-1943
David Hall
This paper, taken from the research conducted for my PhD thesis, offers an assessment of the difficulties Britain faced in trying to maintain its policy towards the Free French during the Second World War. It suggests particularly that the development of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' was a detrimental factor in these efforts, and caused serious divisions within the British War Cabinet.
Peter Hof
War Against Allies
2016 •
Witawin Siripoonsap
The end of the Second World War was brought about by the combined efforts of the Grand Alliance between President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain and Marshal Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. Even though the Allies of the Second World War were one of the few examples of successful alliance throughout history, the alliance was not formed simply for the greater good of humanity but one of necessity. Beneath the atmosphere of cooperation, each leader aimed to satisfy the war aims of their own but despite their differences. However, none was allowed or willing to set aside the differences as national interests were at stake. My work will examine the interactions between the leaders of the three nations and how they fight among themselves to get their way while at the same time trying to win against a common foe. Before the three successfully defeated their enemy or even fought one, they waged their own war on the table to pr...
World War II: The Essential Reference Guide
Editor. World War II: The Essential Reference Guide. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 2012. xxvi + 410 pp.
Priscilla Roberts
In this book an internationally renowned team of historians provides comprehensive coverage of all major campaigns and theaters of World War II, synthesizing the tremendous breadth and depth of source materials on this global conflict. It includes primary-source documents created by both famous leaders and average citizens. • Introductory essays examine the causes, course, and consequences of the war • A bibliography includes recently published books as well as movies and electronic media • A comprehensive chronology clarifies the order of historical events
Peter Hof
Ever since Harry Hopkins had offered unlimited aid to Stalin after Hitler's attack on June 22, 1941, in direct contravention of the American constitution as well as domestic and international law, President Roosevelt had agitated for a personal meeting with the Red dictator, but Stalin deferred, declined, delayed, begged off, and for very good reason. How could he possibly improve on the "everything" that he was already getting from the President? Finally yielding to Roosevelt's repeated, almost pathetic requests, Stalin deigned at long last to meet him (and Winston Churchill) personally at Teheran. At Cairo on November 26, 1943, three days before the Teheran summit, Roosevelt met with Chiang Kaishek and advised him to admit Mao Tse-tung and the Communists into the Nationalist Chinese government, ostensibly to help fight the Japanese. This had the practical effect of exiling Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists to the island of Formosa (now Taiwan) and delivering the whole of China to Communist domination. This shameful betrayal of the Chinese people properly set the tone for the fateful Teheran Conference which played-out against the backdrop of the Italian campaign.
The Journal of North African Studies
Did Amrika promise Morocco's independence? The nationalist movement, the Sultan, and the making of the ‘Roosevelt Myth’
2014 •
David Stenner
France in Soviet foreign policy, 1943–45 // Paper presented at the International conference “France and the Second World War in Global Perspective, 1919-45” (University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, July 2015)
Iskander Magadeev (Magadeyev)
Using a new evidence from the Russian, French and British archives and the recently published diplomatic documents, this paper explores the main trends of the Soviet policy with respect to France between the “decisive turn” in the War in 1943 and the Yalta conference in 1945. Reappraising the traditional narrative about the successful and friendly Soviet-French cooperation, author underlines the pragmatic reasons which governed Moscow’s diplomacy. Stalin’s and Soviet diplomats’ attitude to de Gaulle wasn’t static and evolved during the war, though the basic features persisted. Stalin attuned his French policy to the dynamics of the relations inside the “Grand Alliance”. The aim of the Soviet-French rapprochement for Moscow was to provide a possible ally in a case of new war against Germany; to support de Gaulle, whom Moscow preferred to British and American protégés; to facilitate a work of the French communists and a growth of their influence, to prevent an anti-Soviet drift of France and to strengthen the Soviet positions in the “Polish question”
Simpson, Brad. “The United States and the Curious History of Self-Determination.” Diplomatic History 36, no. 4 (2012): 675–694.
Brad Simpson
